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CONSUMER CREDIT AND COMPETITION: THE PUZZLE OF
COMPETITIVE CREDIT MARKETS

EDWARDJJANGER* AND SUSAN BLOCK-LIEB*

Consumer credit markets in the US present a puzzle. As competing explanations
are offered for the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis and skyrocketing default
rates for unsecured consumer credit,' two seemingly inconsistent facts confound
the discussion. While consumer credit markets are, by all accounts, competitive,
consumers find themselves saddled with unsustainable amounts of debt that
accrues interest at rates that are exorbitant. How could these two situations exist
simultaneously? It is an article of antitrust faith that competitive markets are
good for consumers. In a world of competitive markets, there is a limited role for
consumer protection. So long as products are transparent, then consumer
preferences, price competition and the invisible hand should produce market
nirvana.
Coexisting with this puzzle are competing market-failure based explanations
for the consumer credit crisis. Some of these explanations focus on the
"supply-side". In the market for home mortgages, the shift from a face-to-face,
bank-based, invest-and-hold model of mortgage origination to a capital
markets-financed model where mortgage brokers originate mortgages for sale to
securitisation pools is blamed for creating conflicts of interest between investors
and underwriters that inflated an investment bubble. Other explanations focus
on the "demand side". Irresponsible consumers are accused, en masse, of
borrowing beyond their means and endangering the safety and soundness of
financial markets one McMansion at a time.
The post-mortem has led to conflicting prescriptions: (i) do nothing and let
the market correct itself; (ii) regulate the supply side for conflicts of interest and
transparency; (iii) regulate the demand side for transparency; or (iv) regulate the
demand side by prescribing and proscribing certain loan terms. The meme of
* David M Barse Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
** Cooper Family Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.
1 In the second quarter of 2009, the charge-off rates for credit cards and commercial mortgages

were the highest seen since such data have been kept. Federal Reserve Statistical Release,
"Chargeoff and Delinquency Rates on Loans and Leases at Commercial Banks", available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/chgallsa.htm (accessed on 2 February 2010).
Historically, residential mortgage charge-off rates have hovered well below 0.25%. In the second
2 34
quarter of 2009, the charge-off rate was a shocking . %. Similarly, the consumer credit card
9
charge-off rate, generally between 4 and 6% over the last 10 years, is currently at .55%. Ibid.
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"competitive credit markets" is frequently interposed, however, to argue for the
first option over the other, more intrusive and nominally anti-market alternatives
of either market regulation or consumer protection. In this essay we seek to add
nuance to the competition story and seek, in the process, to propose a comprehensive regulatory architecture for consumer credit that uses the dynamics of
competition constructively to channel the behaviour of mortgage underwriters,
regulators and consumers.
In order to untangle the relationship between competition and consumer
credit, one must recognise that there are really four "competition" stories that
need to be understood. The first is the standard competition story between and
among lenders for customers. The second is competition between and among
lending technologies driven by regulatory arbitrage. The third is competition
based on product innovation and differentiation, and the fourth is competition
among regulators. Each of these "competition" stories offers a distinct set of

lessons for those who would try to reform consumer credit markets. Without
understanding each of the four stories, and the interrelationship among them,
reform is likely to miss the mark.
In this short essay, we will seek to sketch the paradox of competition and
consumer protection. Then we will sketch out each of the four competition
stories, some potential competitive benefits and the respective market pathologies
of each. Next, we will evaluate a number of pending US regulatory reforms in
light of these concerns. Finally, we will suggest the outlines of a coordinated
regulatory architecture that seeks to channel the various "competitions" in
productive directions, without unduly stifling those competitive efforts. Given the
space (and time) constraints involved, much will have to be fleshed out during
conversations at the Antitrust Marathon.

A.

COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION: THE PUZZLE

Consumer credit markets changed fundamentally after about 1980, with the
development of a secondary market for home mortgages and the ability of
credit-card-issuing banks to securitise their credit-card receivables. The changes
accelerated through the 1990s, and the freight train went off the rails in 2008
and 2009. Prior to the advent of securitisation, savings and loans issued home
mortgages for their own account, and revolving consumer credit was in its
infancy. Economists predicted that lender risk aversion, coupled with the inability
to price discriminate between high- and low-risk borrowers, would lead to credit
constraint.2 In such an environment, consumer protection had little role. In a
2 JE Stiglitz and A Weiss, "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information" (1981) 71

American Economic Review 393.
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world where consumer credit was undersupplied, underwriting standards did an
imperfect, but probably overzealous, job of protecting consumers.
After 1980, however, everything changed. First, credit reporting made it
possible for national lenders to determine the creditworthiness of borrowers on a
local level and price loans accordingly. Second, the ability to securitise loans
made it possible for lenders to engage in risk-based pricing, and match the risk
attributes of loans to the risk preferences of investors. As such, a market emerged
for issuing credit to riskier customers.
So far the story is all positive. Changes in lending technology eliminated a
market imperfection. This improvement in the market for consumer credit had a
second order effect, however, that may have been unanticipated. Consumers
without experience managing credit had access to credit in unanticipated
amounts. The greater riskiness of these borrowers led unsurprisingly to increases
in consumer defaults. Again, so long as this risk is properly priced, the market for

consumer credit will increase social welfare, albeit with a higher level of default.
As we have explored elsewhere, however, the unalloyed welfare enhancement
story breaks down if one has concerns about consumer rationality, and we do.'
Cognitive psychologists and researchers into behavioural decision making have
raised serious doubts about the ability of many consumers to make rational
decisions about consumer credit. These doubts arise from cognitive limitations
of consumers, many of whom have difficulty comparing or understanding basic
loan terms, from heuristic biases, such as optimism bias and endowment effects,
and from time-inconsistent preferences, sometimes referred to as hyperbolic
discounting. Many consumers are not particularly good at maximising their
preferences where credit is involved. Indeed, confusion about consumer credit
distorts consumption decisions as well as borrowing decisions. To make matters
worse, these cognitive and heuristic biases are well understood by lenders, who
use teaser rates, back-end fees and balloon payments to hide the true cost of
loans.
This disconnection between consumer decision making and consumer
preferences goes part way toward untangling the puzzle of competitive credit
markets and the need for consumer protection. While lenders do not want to
"sell" more credit than borrowers can repay, they may very well wish to sell more
credit than the consumer would want or need if they truly understood its costs.
As such, competitive credit markets may not be welfare maximising.

S Block-Lieb and EJJanger, "The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, Behaviorism, and
the Misguided 'Reform' of Bankruptcy Law" (2006) 84 Texas Law Review 1481.
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CONSUMER CREDIT AND COMPETITION

Consumer error is not the only culprit. In this section, we will identify four
distinct ways in which competition plays a role in the market for consumer credit,
and how it influences the shape of potential consumer protection. We will seek to
identify the competitive benefits and pathologies that exist in the market for
consumer credit, and are looking forward to a discussion that develops these
further.

1. Price and Terms Competition
As noted above, the market for consumer credit is generally believed to be
competitive. Lenders make a profit, but the profit does not appear to be
"supernormal". Indeed, even though the costs of sub-prime loans are often
shockingly high, sub-prime lenders do not appear to earn a higher rate of return
than prime lenders.4 The costs of administering sub-prime loans, along with
higher default rates, eliminate much of the benefit associated with what appears
to be "price gouging". However, for the reasons described above, the fact that the
market is competitive does not mean that it is welfare maximising. Indeed, the
problems in consumer decision making suggest that the market for consumer
credit may create a pair of "lemons equilibria".
The first "lemon" is the most surprising. Price competition is usually thought
to be immune from "lemons" problems. Consumers understand price, and they
usually understand what the product is that they are buying. This is often not the
case with consumer credit. Price competition often takes the form of price
concealment. Worse yet, competing on the basis of price and transparency is a
truly bad marketing strategy where selling your product turns on concealing its
true costs.
The second "lemon" is, not surprisingly, the market for non-price terms in
consumer credit. However, those "non-price" terms are often where the true
costs of the loan lie. Default interest rates, universal default terms, prepayment
penalties, events that terminate favourable teaser rates, and so on are all related
to the "price" of the loan, but they are not presented as part of the principal
amount, the term or the interest rate. For some loans, this is fair, and the default
terms are truly held in reserve for non-payment. However, for many consumer
loans, the default rates, late fees and penalties are part of the business model,
and where the real profit lies. Because these terms are both non-transparent, and
designed to capitalise on consumer heuristic biases, it is unlikely that competition
will, by itself lead to the elimination of these problematic terms.
4 C Yom, "Limited Purpose Banks: Their Specialities, Performance, and Prospects" [2005] FDIC
Banking Review 19, 28.
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Thus, the market for consumer credit, while competitive, is not welfare
maximising because of the two "lemons" equilibria described above, or, to put it
another way, because of the intentional blurring of the line between price and
non-price competition.
2. Competition among Lending Technologies: Regulatory Arbitrage
and Agency
The second form of competition is the competition among lending technologies.
From the Depression forward, consumer lending was handled by banks.
Mortgages were issued by savings and loans, or by national banks, but were held
by the bank for their own account. Banks' capital requirements were regulated,
and the safety and soundness of the banking system was monitored by the
various bank regulators, the FDIC, the OCC and the Federal Reserve. With the
emergence of a secondary market for home mortgages, the regulatory
architecture began to change. The moving of mortgages out of banks and into
mortgage pools had the effect of moving mortgage lending out of the more
traditional bank regulatory structure.
Initially, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac exercised some control over the shape
of the securitisation market by limiting the loans with access to the secondary
market to prime, conforming loans. Later, however, as a secondary market
emerged for sub-prime and non-conforming loans, the effect of securitisation on
mortgage terms reversed. It led to a proliferation of products and a proliferation
of terms that were no longer subject to the requirements of either bank
regulators or the standardising force of Fannie or Freddie. As such, the shift from
bank-based mortgage finance was driven, to a certain extent, by regulatory
arbitrage. Instead of being regulated by bank regulators for safety and
soundness, the new "capital markets"-based mechanisms for financing mortgages
were regulated by securities regulators solely for disclosure. As such, the new
"securities" products began their own competitive process of innovation, from
RMBS to CDO to CDO-squared, all the way to synthetic CDOs, where no
mortgages were involved at all. Oddly, the demand and supply sides did an about
face. There was such a strong demand for mortgage-backed financial products
that the supply of "mortgages" could not keep up with the demand.
This change in lending technologies had the result of creating a number of
agency problems. One set appeared at the originator stage, where originators
would choose which mortgages to keep for their own account and which to sell
to the secondary market. A second set of agency problems appeared with regard
to the gatekeepers-appraisers, underwriters and rating agencies-all of which
were compensated based on volume of deals rather than on the success of those
deals or the accuracy of their ratings.
These competitive pressures placed increased burdens on two flawed decision
makers. First, consumers were faced with a plethora of products, sold, in various
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ways, as providing them with access to the American Dream (be it a house or flat
screen TV). Second, investors were presented with a plethora of non-transparent
mortgage-backed investment products that were sold as "investment grade",
when it is now by no means clear that the ratings agencies understood, in any
meaningful way, how to assess the risk of these complex financial products. On
both the consumer lending side and the capital markets side, the institutions that
were "selling" consumer credit were competing for suckers (including home
buyers about to start a family and grandparents hoping to be able to augment
their retirement nest egg).
3. Competition through Product Development
Another aspect of the market for consumer credit has been the development of
new financial products. Prior to 1980, there were a limited number of so-called
"plain vanilla" mortgage products: 30 year and 15 year fixed rate mortgages, and
perhaps an adjustable rate mortgage. Even during the initial stages of the
development of mortgage securitisation the secondary market for home
mortgages was controlled by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Access to the securitisation market was limited to the plain vanilla prime mortgages, and so, at least
initially, the development of mortgage-backed securities actually operated to
regulate the terms of most small to medium-sized consumer mortgages.
As the RMBS market moved beyond the prime mortgages that Fannie and
Freddie could purchase, new, exotic products began to emerge. High loan to
value mortgages, ARMs with teaser rates or balloons, and home equity loans,
used to consolidate credit card debt, proliferated. On the one hand, these
product innovations provided many options to consumer borrowers; on the
other, they may have created the opportunity for confusion and deception that
has led to the crisis of overleverage we currently face.
4. Regulatory Competition
The final competition story is one of regulatory competition. Regulation of
consumer credit is currently quite decentralised under US law. Different pieces
of the consumer credit market are regulated, respectively, by the Federal Reserve,
the OCC, the FTC, the FDIC, the SEC and cognate state regulators. Each of
these regulators has concurrent responsibility for a different piece of the
consumer credit market, and none has primary responsibility. The banking
regulators are focused principally on the safety and soundness of the banking
system, while the SEC is focused principally on protecting those who invest in
either shares of banks or in asset-backed securities. Only the FTC has consumer
protection as part of its central mission, but it has no particular expertise in or
responsibility for financial instruments. This balkanisation of regulation has led
Elizabeth Warren and Oren Bar-Gill to propose a single, centralised Consumer
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Financial Products Safety Commission (discussed below).' We see considerable
advantages to such an agency, but we also recognise that there are considerable
advantages to a decentralised regulatory architecture. Multiple agencies are
harder to capture.

Multiple

agencies

can divide

up tasks according to

comparative competencies. Multiple agencies can provide multiple poles in a
policy debate, and can spur or retard regulation. On the other hand, it may also
lead to lack of coordination. The effects of regulatory competition are
ambiguous. They can lead to cooperation, or to conflicting mandates and coordination problems.

C.

TOWARDS A COORDINATED REGULATORY ARCHITECTURE

We are thus faced with two failed markets-the demand for consumer credit and
the institutions for supplying it, and four stories of imperfectly channelled
competition. The puzzle of consumer protection therefore requires an approach
to regulation that simultaneously recognises the limitations of consumers, the
realities of consumer lending and the limits of lending institutions. Protecting
consumers on the demand side must be done in a way that is sensitive to its
effects on the supply side.
With that in mind, it is useful to identify the key problems identified above:
1.
2.

3.

consumer cognitive limitations and heuristic biases (consumer protection);
the conflicts of interest that arise between loan originators and securities
purchasers as a result of the shift from face to face lending to capital
markets financing (investor protection); and
the need for coordination among regulators (regulatory competition and
coordination).

Also, in the long run, securitisation is not going away, so the realities of the
capital markets require products that can be standardised and pooled.
Each of these problems suggests an attribute of the regulatory architecture
that we propose. First, there must be regulation of the terms of consumer loans
that encourage transparency, and, more importantly comprehension of loan
terms and loan consequences. Second, many of our concerns about complexity
and moral hazard are alleviated when a lender is lending face to face, with the
expectation that they will hold the loan to term. Third, regulation of consumer
credit requires more than regulation of loan terms and products. It also
implicates the safety and soundness of the banking system and the integrity of
the securities markets.
0 Bar-Gil and E Warren, "Making Credit Safer" (2008) 157 University ofPennsylvania Law Review 1.
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EVALUATING CURRENT REFORM PROPOSALS

A brief evaluation of the various reform proposals that are currently on the table
simultaneously shows the risks of a non-coordinated approach, and suggests some
of the attributes of a coordinated architecture. The two major proposals on the
table are (i) the "Miller Bill", 6 which proposes an "appropriateness" standard for
consumer loans and would give the borrower a defence if the loan were deemed
unsuitable: and (ii) the above-mentioned proposal for a Consumer Financial
Products Safety Commission. In addition, for comparison purposes it is worth
taking a look at the manner in which the UK has regulated consumer loans.
First, the Miller Bill suggests that mortgage originators should be subject to
liability and borrowers should have a defence to payment where it can be shown
that the lender originated an "inappropriate" loan. Appropriateness is measured
by reference to the borrower's ability to pay, and also with regard to the interest
rate and housing market risks embodied in the loan through rate adjustments,
balloon payments and/or prepayment penalties. The problems that such an
appropriateness requirement addresses are real but, to the extent that it uses a
"standard" to impose liability, there is considerable worry about the effect that
such a requirement might have on the ability of originators to securitise their
loans.
Second, there is a pending proposal for the creation of a Consumer Financial
Products Safety Commission that would pass on the safety of financial products.
The Consumer Financial Products Agency Act would transfer enforcement
authority and rule-making authority under a wide variety of consumer lending
statutes to this new agency. There is a lot to recommend such an idea. In
particular, through its rule-making authority, the new agency could generate safe
harbours and sustainability requirements that were both more specific and more
flexible than those written into a statute like the Miller Bill. However, it also
raises some concerns. First, to the extent that it sets out particularised limitations
on the forms that loans might take, it may stifle innovation. Second, to the extent
that it is granted exclusive jurisdiction over consumer financial instruments, it
may be subject to capture.
Third, in evaluating these two proposals, it may be worth taking a look at the
UK experience, where they have an existing architecture involving standardsbased regulation of consumer finance, managed by a single regulator. As we have
discussed elsewhere, the UK consumer lending markets have functioned well,
notwithstanding an appropriateness standard that lacked the safe harbours
contained in the Miller Bill. Indeed, while UK investors have suffered because of
6 Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act, HR 2529, 11Ith Congress (2009).
The proposed text of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act, HR 3126, 111th Congress
(introduced on 8 July 2009), is available at http://www.fmancialstabiitygov/docs/CFPA-Act.pdf
(accessed on 2 February 2010).
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their exposure to the US sub-prime market, the UK has not had a similar
sub-prime crisis involving its own citizens.

E.

KNITTING THE PROPOSALS TOGETHER

In our view, the regulation of consumer credit transactions requires a merging of
each the three approaches embodied in the pending regulatory reforms. First,
what is needed is a mix of standard based regulation and safe harbours. The
"appropriateness" standard of the Miller Bill represents a suitable default.
Mortgage originators should take care not to saddle borrowers with
unsustainable debt, and where they do, borrowers have reason to complain.
At the same time, the possibility of an "appropriateness" defence will render
most loans unsecuritisable. As such, this would significantly raise the cost of
consumer credit, and this is not desirable. In our view, therefore, to the extent
that there are well-understood transparent and straightforward loan products
and basic documentation requirements, many consumer loans could be subject
to an appropriateness safe harbour, and therefore available for securitisation. By
contrast, non-standard loans would be subject to a more amorphous appropriateness standard. Such loans would not be forbidden, but the lenders would not
be able to sell the loans to the aftermarket, and would have to hold them for
their own account.
A key role of any proposed regulator would be to define the terms and establish
the outlines of these safe harbours. As such, the two pending proposals might work
better in tandem than standing alone. Finally, it seems to us crucial that the
jurisdiction of any proposed financial services regulator would be concurrent
rather than exclusive. Risks of capture are significant where consumer protection
is concerned, so a decentralised approach is probably preferable.

E

CONCLUSION

The observations and conclusions contained in this essay are obviously quite
tentative, and the competition stories, in particular, are not fully or rigorously
developed. Much of the discussion about consumer credit has involved advocates
of consumer protection talking past experts on bank and securities regulation.
Competition scholars have played a relatively minor role, while the meme of
competitive credit markets and the need to preserve competition and innovation
have been offered by the financial services industry as reasons to stay the hands
of the regulator. We hope that this paper and the discussion at the Antitrust
Marathon will go part way toward adding nuance to this role currently played by
"competition"-based arguments in the policy discussion.
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PROF JANGER: First I want to thank Philip and Spencer for organising the
Antitrust Marathon. My quadriceps will forgive you shortly. Spencer told me I
had five minutes and I understand at a marathon one has to pay close attention
to one's splits, although sometimes they are aspirational. I will get the major ideas
out on the table first and then fill in some of the detail later.
What I am hoping to do is look at a single economic sector and explore the
role that both competition and regulation play at a time when the sector is, quite
frankly, in crisis. First I will describe one puzzle and two market failures stories
that help solve the puzzle. Then I will argue that the discussion about
competitive consumer credit markets is different from the usual focus on ex ante
product competition. In order think about consumer credit, you need to pull
apart the idea of competition and see how the many different roles it is playing
in the regulatory architecture. Finally, I will talk about two legislative proposals
and whether can be tied together to channel competition.
First, the puzzle? It is generally agreed that credit markets are competitive;
nobody is making a supernormal profit; what could be going on here? So how
can there be a competitive credit market and at the same time a market that has
ended up in crisis both on the supply side and on the demand side due to
consistent over borrowing and over-lending?
The key here is that two overlapping market failures are in play: a supply side
market failure and a demand side market failure.
The supply side market failure on the supply side, the failure is a product of
the shift from a bank-oriented approach to mortgage and consumer credit
financing, to one financed through securitisation. This could largely be viewed as
a deregulatory move but also had some important market perfecting attributes,
in that it increased the liquidity of debt. However, agency problems and gate
keeper failures emerged because regulatory institutions didn't keep up with the
shift.
On the demand side the problem was alluded to by Max in his paper. It goes
by a number of names: the behavioural economics problem; the stupid
consumer problem; or the too dumb to have a credit card problem. But the
problem is more complicated. There are really three different things going on.
The first is a cognitive problem. There are limits to what rational consumers
can be expected to. My co-author, Susan Block-Lieb, did a paper a number of
years ago where she showed that if you look at the ability of consumers to
understand the difference between interest rates on two fully disclosed loans
about 40% of the relevant consumers couldn't do it. So even with transparency, you are going to end up with a significant number of ill considered
consumer choices.
The second set are the ones we would call behavioural in the sense they are
based on consumer biases and heuristics. The third is time-inconsistent
preferences. Paradoxically consumers will charge roughly a much higher interest
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rate for a one week than for a one year loan-they emphasise current consumption and current fees over back end costs.
Susan and I have written a bigger article called the "Myth of the Rational
Borrower",' which lays this out in more detail. The concern is not that
consumers are all irrational, but that there are enough irrational borrowers that
it becomes policy relevant. More importantly, all of these irrationalities point in
one direction. They incline consumers toward over-borrowing.
So a market failure on the supply side led to a shift to a marketing mode.
This, in turn, led to a tendency to overland. And, a demand side market failure
led to a tendency to over-borrow. Together, these two market failures had a
perfect storm effect that manifested in 2008. Thus a failure of regulation and a
failure of consumer protection ended up having safety and soundness
consequences for the banking system.
If you are going to regulate in this area, you have to define the role of
competition, and I think there are four competition stories, not just one-all
inflected by behavioural economics and public choice theory.
First you have the classic competition story about price and terms
competition. Here I think the thing to think about is the lemons equilibrium,
Consumers generally don't differentiate particularly well on the basis of
non-price terms. As a result, market participants don't have an incentive to
compete on the basis of non-price terms so the competitive equilibrium is
suboptimal.
To make matters worse, in the consumer credit market, since consumers
aren't good at understanding the price terms of consumer credit, you can end up
with a lemons equilibrium on price terms. These self-reinforcing lemons
equilibria make it difficult for competition law to be viewed as the way of solving
the problem.
The second competition story is one of regulatory arbitrage. Competition
between sets of lending institutions, banks and shadow banks or securitisation
pools or capital markets is appropriate. But one of the important pieces of the
competition was a regulatory arbitrage. Securitisation pools are not subject to
lender capital requirements. Therefore a bank that loaned through a securitisation pool could capitalise on this regulatory loophole. Because the securitisation
pool wasn't a bank, a bank could then buy the assets and the loan would count as
capital, not a risky loan. This loophole made it profitable to lend through securitisation without really thinking through whether you were trading of some of the
institution's comparative advantage as a lender.
The third competition story is an innovation story. If you regulate too much
you are going to cut off product development. This may be true, but there are
1

S Block-Lieb and E Janger, "The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Behaviorism, Rationality and
the Misguided "Reform" of Bankruptcy Law?" (2006) 84 Texas Law Review 1481.
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two different types of product development: product development that is welfare
enhancing and gives consumers additional options and product development
that is designed to capitalise on the lemons problems that I identified earlier.
Finally you have got a regulatory competition problem. Institutions with
overlapping jurisdiction seek to regulate consumer protection. While one would
think that this would lead to a race to regulate, that hasn't been the model at all.
Instead there has been a tendency to hang back. As such, it is hard to tell
whether you are going to get a race to regulate or a race to capture. When you
have got overlapping jurisdictions how it plays out in any particular context is
going to be relatively difficult to figure out.
In evaluating the two legislative proposals that are on the table, one needs to
keep all these things in mind. First, there is the proposal for a consumer financial
products safety administration-a single centralised FTC for consumer financial
products where all of the regulatory authority that is currently located in a
variety of banking and securities institutions would be transferred to this agency
as the primary though not exclusive regulator. I have a significant reservation
about this approach in that you don't know whether it is going to become a
powerful regulator or a one stop shop for interest groups.
The second proposal is to create an appropriateness standard that basically
says if you make a loan that is unsuitable because of its terms or unsuitable
because of its interest rate there will be a defence to enforcement. This has the
problem-or maybe it is the benefit-that it becomes virtually impossible to
securitise the loan. Opponents therefore say that this will kill the securitisation
market. For me, however, this is a feature rather than a bug. The response, which
I think is fruitful, is to think about which types of loans ought to be safe
harboured. I think that these two proposals, taken together, suggest a potential
architecture for coordinated regulation. I will stop there working that would be
tricky; we can talk more about how one might do it.
MR MARSDEN: Thank you very much. That's a perfect example of how our
spotlight on one sector can reveal all sorts of concerns about competition and
confidence and consumer protection issues. Philippa, you are going to broaden it
out a little bit?
MS WATSON: Yes, I am going to broaden it out a little bit in the sense that I am
going to look and see how competition policy or how competition laws and rules
can be required to be departed from in the public interest. This is a very
interesting debate and it is an issue which is very far from being solved It is a
moving target-running alongside ever-changing government priorities. Now,
even the most ardent fans of competition will admit that competition policy and
competition rules cannot solve all life's problems. Increasing importance is being
attached to public interest. Both government, and I mean government on a

80

Antitrust Marathon IV

ECJ VOL. 6 NO. I

global level, and consumers require that certain matters which they regard as
being in the collective interest ought to have prime importance. I am thinking
about environmental policy, I am thinking about financial stability, I am thinking
about research and development, innovation, going down the ladder social
policy, long-term unemployment, integrating the disadvantaged into the labour
market, a lot of considerations which the public say look, these problems have to
be sorted out and they must be allowed to be sorted out unhindered or at least
hindered only to a minimal extent by competition regulation. So we are then
confronted with the question as to what extent can the competition rules be
constrained in the public interest and how should that constraint be managed.
Let me start with Article 10 of the EC Treaty, which is a loyalty clause. You are
in the club, you must not prevent the club from performing properly. This was
the article which the ECJ used in the GBNO case, 1977,2 which now seems a
century away. The Court there said look, Article 10 requires that a Member
State does not either introduce or maintain in force rules which deprive the
competition rules laid down in the Treaty of their effectiveness. This brought the
state firmly within the ambit of the competition rules; hitherto the situation had
been a bit sketchy, and we must remember that was 32 years ago, when the state
was a more powerful economic entity in the sense of the sectors which were
subject to its uncontested monopoly control than it is today.
Article 10 is a clause which covers all areas of Community policy. At the same
time we have throughout the Treaty provisions which allow a certain departure
from the Community rules under specified or prescribed circumstances. With
respect to competition law we have a number of tools which we can use, to
protect the public interest. We have first of all Article 81.3, which requires the
balancing of a number of factors. Secondly, we have the definition of an
undertaking and that defines the scope of application for the competition rules.
An undertaking is an entity which engages in economic activity. Therefore, if an
entity is engaging in activity which is not economic, it is not subject to the
competition rules. Now, generally those types of services which the state delivers
as part of its prerogative-as opposed to being part of an economic
activity-are non-economic in nature, I am thinking about education, health,
welfare.
But recently the division between economic and non-economic sectors has
become less clear. In the past, if one looked at the provider of services, that in
itself would be a strong indication of the nature of those services.
You would be able to say this is an economic activity and that is not economic
activity because traditionally the state didn't engage in economic activities and
traditionally the state was the main provider of non-economic services. Business
was not in the business of welfare provision, put it that way, it didn't regard itself
2 Case 13/77 SA GB-INVO-BMv Association des ditaillantsen tabac (ATAB) [1977] ECR 2115.
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as being a charitable organisation looking after the population as a whole, that
was the prerogative of the state or the state's duty Now things have become
slightly blurred, the state is engaging in economic activity and there are
undertakings engaging in economic activity but which may have, as part of their
business, a certain amount of non economic activity.
This has required us to look at how you divide the one activity from the
other-and thus determine the application of the competition rules. This issue
has been resolved mainly through the case law of the European Court of Justice,
which at times has had to grapple with conflicting and sensitive issues. In a series
of cases that have come before the Court you have, for example, providers of
pension funds, providers of healthcare services, providers of other types of social
services which argue they are not subject to the competition rules because they
are engaged in uneconomic activity. So the Court has had to say wait, let's see if
this is actually true. What the Court has done is it has focused on the activity, the
nature of the activity, how it is carried out, and it is decided on that basis where
the dividing line is between economic and non-economic activity. So we have
moved away from looking at the characteristics of the provider of services and
supplies to looking at the entity as a whole-the nature of its business, its
customer profile, etc.
The third tool we have in our toolbox is services of general interest. Now,
services of general interest divide themselves again into to services of general
interest or what the public authorities classify as being of general interest and
they may be subject to specific public service obligations to ensure their balanced
delivery This again is a moving target; what is a service of general interest in
France, for example? It may not necessarily be a service of general interest in the
United Kingdom, Germany or Poland. It is a variable concept, taking on a
different meaning from state to state. Services of general interest are again
divided into non-market services and market services, and that reflects the same
principles that define the concept of an undertaking.
Non-economic services are generally out of the scope of the competition
rules. Services of economic interest fall in principle within the competition rules
but, because they are services of economic interest which must be provided to
citizens, the providers of those services may receive a softer and more flexible, a
more attenuated treatment under the competition rules, which, if applied with
full force, might prejudice the delivery of the services in question. This generally
takes the form maybe of an exclusive licence. Services have got to be provided.
The market will not provide all those services. The citizen needs them: it may be
argued the citizen has a right to them. I am really waiting for that case when the
citizen invoking his right to an essential service goes to court and says I need a
decent X service and I am not getting it. That is going to be great fun, where you
get the citizen's right to decent quality of service pitched against the obligations
of the service provider.
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Let me go back to my train of thought which I hope I haven't quite
lost-and it is that services of economic interest must be provided to the citizen.
There are many economic operators who may not be prepared to provide those
services unless they are protected from excessive commercial risk, by means, for
example, of an exclusive licence. This may mean they get the exclusive right to
exploit the whole or part of a market without being subject to the full rigour of
competition rules.
Markets may be opened up to competition. Parts of those markets may not
attract competition, may not attract an interested undertaking. It is not very
attractive to run a bus route around the Aran Islands, but it may be very attractive
to run a bus route around Dublin. Come to think of it, is not very attractive to run
a bus route around Dublin traffic is such that it is very difficult to get the bus
moving.
So what do you do in order to make sure that your citizens, no matter where
they are placed, have got equal access to services and essential services? You say
to certain economic operators I know you want to service the Dublin area, you
will make a lot of money there, you will make a lot of money if you service
Manchester, but I want you to do the Outer Hebrides and the Aran Islands, and
for this purpose I will give you special concessions or I will pay you to do it. So
what you do is you give an operator the right to operate a service and you
impose on that operator a public service obligation. Either he or she must, as
part of the licence conditions, pledge a certain degree of service, and if that isn't
enough to attract that operator to the market additional incentives must be
offered, for example, a guaranteed cash payment. In paying that operator, what
are you doing? You are giving state aid, so you fall into another box of problems,
but you are whipped out of that box if you pay the operator no more than is
necessary for him to operate that service plus a reasonable profit. Any more and
you are back into the state aid box because you are giving him more than he
actually needs to perform that service with a reasonable profit so you are actually
favouring one operator over and above his competitors by paying him more than
necessary to provide those services.
So we have public service obligations, and that is the way citizens are
provided with essential services to which they are deemed to have a right.
Another tool in our little box is universal service. The principle of universal
service implies that there is an obligation on suppliers of services and goods, to
provide at an affordable rate a guaranteed quality service to all citizens who wish
to use that service.
Now, I need to swivel around rather quickly because I am rather short of time
and I am a very slow runner. Taking stock, we see that there are tools in our box
to manage and balance conflicting policies. Such a balancing act is not as easy as
it would appear. This is a very tricky area of the law and it is constantly evolving
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and it requires an on-going balancing of interests, which it is often very difficult
to do.
Moving on, how do you increase competition in areas in which the
government has traditionally been the exclusive operator? For example, we have
a plethora of government policies. Government now regulates every atom of our
existence. How do you make sure the government acts in a competitive way
when formulating policy and law? The tool that is generally used-and this has
been developed relatively recently-is the impact assessment toolkit. This has
been developed first of all at EC level, where we see that all policies have got to
be looked at under a certain number of criteria to make sure they don't conflict
with each other. For example, their impact on small and medium size enterprises
has to be determined, as well as the cost for the proposal in issue to either
government or the Community A series of criteria that have been developed
against which Community policies when they are being developed or when
legislation is being formulated must be judged.
Secondly, the OFT has developed the principle of impact assessment-2005,
recently revised in 2009, I believe-in collaboration with the Better Regulation
Executive, under which any legislative or policy proposal must be looked at
under four heads to see the extent to which it is going to have an impact on the
competition. The OECD in 2007 produced its impact assessment toolkit very
much modelled on the OFT model in which it says policy initiatives-legislative
initiatives must be looked at under a number of criteria. Now, you can apply
your instrument of impact assessment at various points in time. You can take it
out when policy is being formed so that policy doesn't actually translate into
anticompetitive action, be it legislative, regulatory or otherwise. You can invoke it
at the legislative stage when you have actually got your legislation drafted and
therefore you can see very clearly what you are talking about. There is an
advantage there. Or you can go retrospectively, and this is what they did in
Australia, you take out everything on the statute book, put it on the table and say
right, let's get through all of this and see what is on our legislative book which is
anticompetitive. Can the anticompetitive elements be reduced and still achieve
the objectives of that legislation?
The Australians decided to do this in the mid-1990s. They said to themselves
look, we are a bit sluggish down here at the end of the world so we had better do
something about ourselves, and they did. A report was produced that examined
1,700 pieces of legislation. Amendments were made to the legislation to make
sure that competition rules and policy were respected insofar as possible without
sacrificing the objectives of that legislation. It was done at various levels, and this
means impact assessment can be done at various levels. Impact assessment
should be done at any level which makes regulation, so it can be done at the level
of the local authority which regulates taxis and buses for example, central
government-anywhere in between the top and the bottom of the government
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chain. The Australians actually paid for this. There is nothing that cannot be
achieved in this world, it seems, with money. The Australian government paid
the state legislatures per capita of population for engaging in this exercise. It
proved very successful. The Australian economy duly went up enormously, the
economy was richer by billions of dollars, so, although near the end of the
exercise the Australians were paying out about 800 million dollars, in fact they
recouped that several fold because as the economy grew they got more taxes, et
cetera. It did give that kick start which the Australians felt they needed when they
started to look at the situation in 1993.
A similar technique has been applied in Korea and Hungary. Mexico has
done it ,and I think it has been done a bit in Latin America. One last word:
whatever constraints are put on competition policy, they should be and are
certainly in Community law subject to two principles. One is the principle of
proportionality: you do no more than is absolutely necessary. You do not depart

from the competition rules any more than is necessary to achieve whatever
public interest objective you are trying to achieve and you stick to the principle
of equality, you treat your operators equally. I'm sorry that this contribution to
the debate has been in more general terms than I would have wished, but I am
struggling to get to the finishing line within a respectable time limit. I'm perfectly
prepared to discuss my thoughts further.
MR MARSDEN: Thank you very much, Philippa. Would that your last
principle proportionality be possible to be implemented when you have these
bigger beasts out there who couldn't care less about competition.
MS GOGGIN: Great paper and great response. There are, I think, a huge range
of issues. The one I wanted to focus on is in terms of when to depart from the
competition rules, what the standard of proof should be and, in particular, what
the standard of proof should be in difficult economic times. Because some of
these issues, for instance, environmental policy, unemployment, regional issues
and so on, have been played out through state aid decisions and through competition decisions over many years. But particularly when you have a financial
crisis there is a lot of calls for knee jerk responses which limit competition. The
difficulty from my point of view I think is in terms of the benefits that
competition policy brings to consumers and to the economy in general, there is a
whole history, there is the economic backup saying this is a good thing but in
times of crisis you get a political knee jerk response saying, for instance, in
Ireland we have had restrictions on the application of the competition rules in
mergers in the banking sector. Now, this was a while back, and in terms of
explanations for the financial crisis I think "some of our financial institutions
being too small to survive" came just after "it was all the fault of short sellers
attacking Anglo Irish", and maybe just before "some of our financial institutions
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are too big to fail", and after that it was "Colonel Mustard in the study", I can't
remember all these. The issue of competition policy in difficult times, I know
John Fingleton has written about this recently, and John Evans and Carol Boate
from the Competition Authority here have had a very incisive article in the
competition press,' but it seems a rolling back of the competition rules is being
achieved at a very low threshold of proof. It applies to mergers because you have
the failing firm defence in the banking sector being mooted as something more
than it is but also a push for national champions for consolidation and so on.
There is really no substitute for having a proper discussion about the
economic pros and cons of these, but equally when these things are being put
forward the argument is "there is no time to have that discussion and it's not
going to happen". I don't have a solution to this, I am just putting this forward as
a problem. Similarly, just to comment on the regulatory impact assessment: I
have done a bit of work on that in Ireland and I think it really only works when
you have genuinely considered alternatives, because [in] imposing it simply as an
administrative requirement you tend to get a retrofitting of the arguments to the
decision that has already been taken. So they read like Goldilocks and the Three
Bears, because you come along and you look at this one solution and that won't
work because it's too strict, and you look at this other solution and that won't
work because it's too lenient but, surprise, surprise, you come to the one you
were going to do all along and that fits just right. So that is a kind of depressed
statement there about the difficulty of maintaining the integrity of competition
policy in difficult times.
MR ELITHORN: I thought a very interesting paper and a very thorough
response too. I am a pessimist and an optimist on this one. I am a pessimist
because I don't think the competition community always sells its message well
here and I think, although you say even the most ardent competition advocate
would accept there are other things, I have sat at tables where that doesn't come
across and I have sat at the OECD financial services forum where there was a
clear split in the room between those that were saying our precious competition
rules are being trampled over and those that said these are extraordinary times,
how do we make sure that we preserve as much of the principles as we can? So I
think there is still quite a long way for the competition community to go in selling
itself in this context.
The reason I am an optimist is because I think there is an awful lot to sell and
an awful lot that can be done and, if you engage early enough in the process,
there are many occasions where through proper advocacy a better solution can
be found that both achieves the public policy objective and maximises the
J Evans and

C Boate, "Competition Policy and Enforcement in an Economic Crisis" (2009) 16(8)
Competition 208.
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benefits of competition in that process, whether that is by considering
competition for the market versus competition in the market and which deals
with some of the state aid issues. If you say for public policy reasons we will pay
a subsidy for the Aran Islands, let's have a competition for who can do it in these
circumstances, at the best price. That preserves the benefits of the competitive
process.
I think one of the lessons from the financial crisis is that a time of crisis is the
worst place to start building a relationship and that it is important to have built
that relationship so when a crisis comes someone does pick up the phone to you
and say if we are trying do this can you give us a bit of help with problem
solving? And, again going back to my experience at an OECD meeting, there
were those that took the view you don't want to be in the room because you will
be blessing sin. I think that is quite an extreme position to take. To be credible
you need to have a clear set of principles, articulate those principles well and
help people find the right solutions, and competition advocacy plays a huge role
in supporting competition policy in that case and a role that I think still needs to
be built further.
MR MARSDEN: Thank you very much. There is nothing more demoralising in
a marathon than finding out that a feed station is about two miles further away
than you think it is. So, recognising that we are approaching lunch and will
continue the discussion afterwards, I am going to take three more comments
now.
MR McDOWELL: I was very interested in Edward and Susan's paper. Just to
focus our attention again, we are talking here at this meeting about regulation
and competition, and perhaps not doing full justice to Edward's paper. I could
say okay, we can summarise this as saying "look, you have the financial crisis, this
can be thought of as a consequence of a lot of competition in a market where
there is a lot of market failure full stop". In a sense that is what we are talking
about, and the solution to this is to deal with the instance of market failure. The
danger I see in this is that there is also a tendency I think to water down
competition. Now, first principles in economics tells us that what we should be
doing is concentrating on the incidences of market failure, and it is only in the
circumstances that we can't correct those that you can make a case for curbing
competition.
Looking at this, the diagnosis here is a set of markets which have systemic
market failure effectively due to bounded rationality on the part of everybody in
the market. I think there is a case for arguing there is bounded rationality in
some parts of the market, but there is also something else going on which is that
in fact agents in the market were being super rational because they took the view
that they could borrow, they were being told they could. They knew very well
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they could hand back the keys if things went wrong. The people who were
lending them money took the view they could securitise it and pass on the loan.
In other words, what we were dealing with here is simply moral hazard, which I
am fond of saying is not something that happens at a disco to your daughter but

is something which is simply a consequence of information, a symmetry So it is
a moral hazard problem we are dealing with here, it is not, I think, in most cases
bounded rationality
I think your very perceptive comment in this that the issue that the rating
agencies had a lot to do with this, this is a genuine case of bound irrationality
People were looking at what was going on in terms of classical statistical
inference, where all events are independent, rather than thinking in terms of
"one mortgage goes, all mortgages go" so in effect the standard models being
used or being applied were not the correct models.
So, just to summarise on this, I would be inclined to think of this as a moral

hazard problem rather than a simple bounded rationality thing to a large extent
and in that case where does it come, and in fact it all comes from the deregulation in the 1980s and the unpleasant thought that what we may be looking at
here is the deregulation of the financial markets in the 1980s which broke down
barriers between them, created these opportunities for moral hazard, and what
we should be trying to do is in effect replace that through regulation and simultaneously to make sure we maintain vigorous competition in regulated markets
because in the absence of that we are just creating rents.
MR STUCKE: I will take the opposite position on this.
I very much enjoyed Ted's paper. What it brought to mind was the recent
happiness economic literature by Daniel Kahneman and Richard Layard,
among others. This research builds on Adam Smith's Theory of Moral
Sentiments and the work by Thorsten Veblen and John Kenneth Galbraith. One
issue is how good are individuals in predicting what makes them happy? The
financial crisis I believe brought this to the fore when you consider the increase
in consumer debt as well as the negative personal savings rate. This, then, would
go to Philippa's point as to what should be in the toolkit and then to Cavendish's
point as to the timing. Do we need to have a better measure of utility than
revealed preferences? For example, Professors Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi have
chaired a commission that considered the limits of GDP as an indicator of a
country's economic performance and social progress. 4 Their recent report
considers other indicators of social progress, including measures of subjective
happiness.

4 Report by the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress
(2009), available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr (accessed on 31January 2010).
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From an Orwellian perspective, a governmental happiness committee is scary
On the other hand, is it realistic for economists and policymakers today to say
that people know what makes them happy when they see this train wreck
happening miles in advance? Is it irresponsible for the government, not so much
telling people what makes them happy but promoting policies that may promote
misery? If the government endorses increased output as invariably good or
wealth as a measure of success or self-worth, is the government then acting as
cheerleaders to an ensuing problem?
MR JANGER: Some very quick, I think pointed, responses to those really
excellent observations. To Isolde, I think your comment about the knee-jerk
response, I think you're right, but I think one of the things that is difficult in a
crisis situation is to distinguish between a knee-jerk response to a crisis and we
told you so, which is to say one of the things a crisis gives you the opportunity to
do is to say let's learn from history what are the lessons, what should we have
seen coming, how would we want to live our lives differently going forward.
Those aren't things that go to the immediate crisis response, which is to say how
do we get banks lending money again, but how do we recondition our markets so
that we identify the problems that aren't the one timers, the one-offs that will go
away because the market figures that out. It is just your heuristic, it is tricky to
distinguish those, but I think it is an exercise that's worth doing.
To Cavendish, sort of a similar point, which is one of the things that drives
me a little bit crazy, and I note it in the paper itself, is the way the word
competition gets used instrumentally in the policy debate by people who are
engaged in special pleading. I am going to be very blunt here, competition gets
teed up as "you are going to interfere in our ability to take advantage of
consumers". I would much rather listen to a competition authority telling me
what the competition policy is than a banker telling me that a particular
regulation is going to lead to less product diversity.
As to the moral hazard problem, I think that is certainly an issue. I think you
have to make a real distinction and an empirical distinction on the moral hazard
problem between commercial borrowing and consumer borrowing and ask
yourself a real empirical question about whether the focus of rationality is on the
lend side or on the borrow side? There is a big consumer debate, bankruptcy
debate, within the United States. We don't have a social safety net, we have
bankruptcy, so you run up too much debt on flat screen TVs and then you file for
bankruptcy, and the theory was that is just moral hazard, we are letting people
walk away from their consumption decisions. There is by now a very large
literature in the United States that shows that when people file, if you really look,
I mean certainly they are going into bankruptcy more leveraged and less
economically robust than they used to, but the things that trigger the
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bankruptcies are not oh, I am walking away from my debt because I don't want
it anymore.

People do all kinds of extraordinary things on an individual level to stay out
of bankruptcy that are colossally irrational, that often lead them to lever up even
more, for example converting dischargeable credit card debt into non-dischargeable home mortgage debt to refinance, and then you end up losing your house
rather than filing for bankruptcy with this much debt. So I think the moral
hazard story on the consumer side is pretty problematic.
On the commercial side everyone was socialising risk, so I think you have got
to look at it on both sides, but I think you have to pull that story apart a little bit
more. As to Maurice's point, I just agree.
MR MARSDEN: Thanks very much. I have good news, bad news and then
more good news. The good news is that in marathion terms you have made it to

"The Wall", at the 20 mile marker. The bad news is that in a 26.2 mile marathon
this is really only the halfway point. The good news, though, is that we have some
fuel outside for you and a fantastic final panel coming up. I hope you can stay
with us and let's go to the next feed station. Thank you very much.

